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ack Goldsmith is a widely admired professor now at Harvard Law School who
spent ten months in the Bush administration during 2003–04 as the head of a special
Justice Department office responsible for giving authoritative interpretations of law to the
executive branch. It was the Office of Legal
Counsel that, in 2002, produced the infamous
“torture memos”, and that, the following year
under Goldsmith, took them back again. Now
it is again in the news, as controversial
memos regarding harsh interrogation issued
by one of Goldsmith’s OLC successors surface in the newspapers. Goldsmith’s partmemoir, part-historical analysis, The Terror
Presidency, examines not just the Bush
administration’s “war on terror”, but the enormous pressures and constraints on future
American Presidencies confronting the threat
of terrorism. The book is superb – deceptively casual and eminently readable, yet
profoundly considered and argued.
Goldsmith is a conservative; “I am not”, he
says unequivocally, “a civil libertarian.” He
expresses no discomfort with the Bush administration’s fundamental approach to 9/11 –
he believes, that the United States is indeed
“at war with terrorists”. Looking forward to
future Presidential administrations, he sees a
need to reshape the struggle against terrorism
in ways that get beyond the permanent use of
emergency presidential powers; he acknowledges that the terminology of “war on terror”
has lost its utility, but he urges retaining the
strategic understanding of a war against transnational terrorism even if its legal contours
shift. The difficulty faced by Goldsmith, however, was that his role in government was to
give binding legal advice to an executive
branch hemmed in by a thicket of laws, complicated, vague and often imposing personal
criminal liability on officials. Goldsmith
believes these laws, mostly dating from the
1970s, are historically unprecedented, sometimes constitutionally dubious, and leave
little room for manoeuvre to government officials who are under enormous pressures both
to keep the population safe from terrorism
and to protect rights and liberties by not
acting aggressively. The threat of criminal
enforcement naturally disinclines lower-level
officials – in particular, the ones who actually
carry out policy – to take the personal legal
risks of criminal prosecution that the aggressive pursuit of counter-terrorism might entail.
The Terror Presidency reaches beyond personal memoir to offer a historical comparison
of the legal powers available to Presidents in
time of war and emergency, under Lincoln,
Roosevelt and Bush. Lincoln and Roosevelt
operated, of course, under immensely fewer
legal constraints than the Bush administration. Lincoln undertook many legally dubious actions, suspending habeas corpus,
for example, and imprisoning large numbers
of suspected Southern sympathizers without
legal recourse; Roosevelt, under the thinnest
cover of complaisant legal opinions issued
by his Attorney General, Robert Jackson,
ignored laws passed by Congress explicitly
aimed at keeping the United States out of war.
He could not even plead the exigencies of war
at that point, because war was precisely what
Congress had legislated to avoid. But even
before 9/11, the Bush administration – particularly Vice President Dick Cheney, through his
mysterious counsel and chief of staff, the
ascetic, iron-willed David Addington – was
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committed to rolling back what it saw as the
dangerous erosion of Presidential power since
the Vietnam war. After 9/11, success in the
war on terror was viewed as identical to the
restoration of executive discretion. Comparing Lincoln and Roosevelt to Bush is therefore to say that they had far more discretionary power, and that this discretionary power
needed to return to the Presidency.

ton “shared a commitment to expanding presidential power” that – although in their eyes
was necessarily co-extensive with prevailing
in the war on terror – to outside observers
forced a choice at key moments between the
war on terror and the abstract principle of
executive power for its own sake. In this,
Lincoln and Roosevelt each chose differently, opting not to go it alone, but instead to
work with Congress towards an agreement
that maximized Presidential power because it
would represent the two political branches
of government. The Bush administration
has adamantly refused to follow this course,
for the foolish lawyerly reason that asking
Congress to roll back its fettering laws would
imply an acceptance that Congress had such
fettering powers in the first place.
The grand irony, Goldsmith observes, is

The White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card informing President George Bush that a
second plane has crashed into the World Trade Center, September 11, 2001
Goldsmith’s point is subtler, however. It
was not so much executive discretion that
allowed Lincoln and Roosevelt to act decisively. It was, rather, that while each was
politically attuned to Congress’s sensitivities,
because they and their subordinates did not
face today’s Congressional restrictions on
Presidential discretion, they thus had a “less
pressing need to assert presidential prerogatives vis-à-vis Congress”. Lincoln and
Roosevelt were politically wary of discretion’s possible excesses; and they could
direct themselves wholly to the substantive
struggles at hand.
Lincoln and Roosevelt, unlike the Bush
administration, anticipated the famous dictum of Justice Jackson that the executive
achieves its maximum power acting in conjunction with the other political branch of
government, Congress. Lincoln, ever the lawyer, remained “anxious about his unprecedented assertions of presidential power” and
“almost always sought congressional support”. Roosevelt on certain crucial issues did
not go to Congress, but still he did not use his
prerogatives as “part of an aggressive program to expand presidential power for its
own sake”. By contrast, Cheney and Adding-

that although the Bush administration lawyers sought “to leave the presidency stronger
than they found it”, in fact they “seem to
have achieved the opposite”. The reason is
simply that the American constitutional system really does have three branches of government. Although the judiciary in principle
has little constitutional role to play in matters
of war or foreign policy generally, the fact
that the war on terror has been conceived by
the administration as a global war – in which
the whole world is the battleground, in which
even American citizens on American soil
could be named as enemy combatants and
indefinitely detained solely on the say-so of
the executive – ensures that the Supreme
Court cannot be left aside.
The administration’s tunnel vision has thus
left it blind to the fact that, by seeming to go
it alone and refusing to go to Congress for
such things as limits, but also authority, to
hold detainees at Guantánamo, or specific
rules on interrogation that confine, but also
legally protect, interrogators, the administration has tied itself in marriage to a far more
exigent spouse – the Court. The message of
successive detainee cases from the Supreme
Court – Hamdi and Hamdan, particularly –
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has not so far been that the constitution
forbids much of what the executive proposes
to do. After all, most of this pertains to noncitizens detained outside the United States;
and until the Bush administration’s spectacularly overreaching legal theories blew up in its
face, no one thought the constitution applied
to them at all. The message is, rather, that
the administration should seek Congressional
assent for what it wants to do. The Court has
signalled provisionally that it will accept at
least some extraordinary rules in the war on
terror – provided, however, that the political
branches have together given those departures
democratic legitimacy. The Court’s limits, following the just argued Boumediene case, to
what the political branches might do even
together are not yet firmly drawn.
But there is no going it alone in a system
of divided constitutional powers. If not
Congress, it will be the Court – or more
exactly, as Benjamin Wittes has noted, the
inconstant Justice Anthony Kennedy, the
Supreme Court’s swing vote – that endorses
policy. In pursuing unfettered executive
power to act alone, the administration has
made Justice Kennedy its five-star general, its
very own Douglas MacArthur in the war on
terror. On the infrequent occasions when the
administration has been forced by the Court
to go to it for authority, it has been denied
practically nothing. It has not so far mattered
that the Bush administration is a lame duck,
or whether Congress is in Republican or
Democratic hands.
The administration seems not to have understood that what lives by executive discretion
dies by executive discretion. If the Bush
administration took counterterrorism as seriously as it took the abstraction of executive
power, it would have thought ahead to its own
departure from office. If it truly believed that
its approach to counterterrorism was correct,
then from the first day of its second term it
would have engaged with Congress to create
institutions to outlive any particular Presidency. It would have thought about the example of the Cold War and how a democracy
deals with a genuine threat to a whole way of
life. In retrospect, the democratic institutions
of the Cold War did a remarkable job of balancing safety and liberty over decades; pure
executive discretion cannot possibly promise
the same. The administration having undertaken none of these things, US counterterrorism policy today flails without long-term
strategic guidance or institutional stability.
Yet any future institutional settlement for
counterterrorism inevitably bumps up against
the contradictory impulses of government
officials who confronted Goldsmith on his
entry into the OLC and impelled his departure not many months later. The Terror Presidency says repeatedly that government policy
after 9/11 was Bush’s instruction to the then
Attorney General, John Ashcroft: “Don’t ever
let this happen again”. For Goldsmith, every
Presidency for the foreseeable future will be
characterized by an “unremitting fear of devastating attack, an obsession with preventing
the attack, and a proclivity to act aggressively
and preemptively to do so”. No matter what
might get said in the course of an election
campaign, a Democratic administration once
in office, “will be even more anxious than the
current President to thwart the attack”. In
order to act as aggressively as the spirit of the
age demands, however, government officials

in the CIA and elsewhere must have confidence that apparently authorized aggressive
actions that turn out to be mistaken, unnecessary, excessive or cause collateral damage to
innocents will not be judged after the fact by
a different set of standards than those going
in. The criminal laws now in place make it
very difficult, however, for operational officers of government, whether in detention, interrogation, surveillance or other covert activities, to have such confidence. The criminal
laws use vague terms such as “inhumane”,
“degrading” or “humiliating” that practically
invite after-the-fact revisionism, creating
legal uncertainties that become insurmountable obstacles to action. Congress and the
administration, in the seemingly perverse
desire to have it both ways – encourage action
but have the option to prosecute it afterwards
– refuse to be specific as to what is actually
permitted and not. Operational officials therefore respond rationally to the disincentives to
act created by legal uncertainty.
Understanding the raison d’être of the torture memos issued by OLC in 2002, prior to
Goldsmith’s arrival, is nearly impossible without understanding their relationship to the
vagaries of these criminal laws. The role of
the OLC for some fifty years has been to
give authoritative advice to the executive
branch on legality and constitutionality. As
Goldsmith notes, of necessity its opinions are
often secret and not reviewable by any court.
This is not as strange as it sounds. It is a part
of the executive’s obligation to “faithfully
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execute” the laws; to do that, the executive
must know what the laws are and what they
mean – a function always delegated, however,
to the Attorney General, constitutionally
obliged to give advice on “questions of law
when required by the President of the United
States”. In practice, however, this might easily tempt lawyers in the OLC to write tendentious briefs to justify what the executive
already intends to do, under circumstances in
which judicial review may not be possible.
The OLC has so far insulated its lawyers
from pressure by the executive. In matters of
national security law, those OLC opinions
operate as immunity against criminal prosecution of officials who act in good faith even if,
ultimately, wrongly. It is almost impossible
for the Justice Department to prosecute an official when that same department’s OLC has
blessed the conduct. The torture memos therefore purported to define torture for purposes of
guiding what the executive might lawfully do.
From the standpoint of CIA agents and other
officials, these opinions offered immunity for
their actions if they acted in reasonable
reliance on them. The OLC in 2002 offered
opinions on the definition of torture that certainly fulfilled this function; but they did so in
ways that Goldsmith could not sustain, drafted
as tendentious and conclusory briefs.
Worse, they did so not within bounds of
what actual administration interrogation
policy might be – waterboarding, for example
– but instead within the maximal legal bounds
offering the most iron-clad protection possi-

ble against criminal liability for anything.
Goldsmith says that he was not disturbed by
the exploration of the outermost limits of the
law against torture as such, but these memos
had a purpose fundamentally different from
simply setting out boundaries. They more or
less authorized anything short of Saddam’s
infamous meat grinder, and then, for good
measure, added that in any case the President
was not bound by any of this. The memos
were disastrous because they left the understanding that these hypotheticals at the outer
orbits of law constituted a statement of the
government’s actual policy proposals. Goldsmith observes that although the charge is frequently made that the Bush administration is
“lawless”, it is better understood as the most
over-lawyered in US history.
Goldsmith was pilloried in press articles
suggesting that he had authored the torture
memos. Only later did it emerge that he had
in fact withdrawn them. This has caused
Goldsmith to be treated in the media as a kind
of hero, a whistle-blower, though Goldsmith
himself feels uncomfortable with “the Manichean tone . . . one sees so often when press
and intellectuals criticize the Bush administration’s attempts to balance liberty and security”. His discomfort is evident from the fact
that he is contributing his profits from this
book to charity and that he has refrained from
wholesale criticism of the Bush administration. As custodian of the OLC, Goldsmith
believed he had a constitutional obligation to
offer opinions that were not merely briefs in

support of a preordained position. Withdrawing the torture memos also meant, as he well
knew, withdrawing immunity upon which
mid-tier government officials and agents had
relied in good faith. Goldsmith’s exit from
government was not on account of his being
fired; indeed, the Attorney General or the
President could have overruled him and did
not. No one stopped Jack Goldsmith from
withdrawing the torture memos; but having
“reversed or rescinded more OLC opinions
that any of my predecessors”, he writes,
many people “lost faith in me. What else
might I withdraw and when?”
Many people believe that the terror threat is
overrated, the problem is to “manage” rather
than defeat it. Goldsmith acknowledges this
emerging view, and while rejecting it does not
seek to refute it. America will live the Terror
Presidency, Goldsmith says, with its dense
moral ambiguities unfolding deep within a
democracy’s many necessary bureaucracies
and institutions. The moral uncertainties, lest
anyone mistake his meaning, are captured
with brutal precision by Goldsmith’s own last
words on the torture memos:
Some people have praised my part in withdrawing and starting to fix the interrogation opinions. But it is very easy to imagine a different
world in which my withdrawal of the opinions
led to a cessation of interrogations that future
investigations made clear could have stopped
an attack that killed thousands. In this possible
world my actions would have looked pusillanimous and stupid, not brave.

